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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 14-3833 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
v. 
 
EVENS CLAUDE, 
a/k/a E, 
a/k/a SHAWN MIRANDA 
 
       Evens Claude, 
        Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:12-cr-00033-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Jan E. DuBois 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 18, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, RESTREPO, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.  
 
(Filed: March 31, 2016) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 A jury convicted Evens Claude of conspiracy, bank fraud, access device fraud, 
aggravated identify theft, uttering counterfeit currency, and aiding and abetting.  He was 
sentenced to 232 months in prison.  Claude timely appealed his sentence.  We will affirm. 
I 
 Claude’s conviction stems from his role in an identity theft ring, through which he 
and his accomplices stole personal information from victims and used that information to 
access the victims’ bank accounts and to open credit accounts and purchase goods in the 
victims’ names.  He was also convicted of crimes arising out of his involvement in a 
scheme to purchase goods using counterfeit currency.   
 At sentencing Claude represented himself pro se, with the assistance of standby 
counsel.  After a three-day hearing, at which the District Court heard testimony and 
entertained argument from both Claude and his standby counsel, the District Court 
sentenced Claude to 232 months in prison, 5 years supervised release, restitution of 
$298,853, and a special assessment of $2,000.  Claude’s effective Sentencing Guidelines 
range was 192 to 402 months, based on his criminal history category of IV and total 
offense level of 32.    
 On appeal Claude argues that the District Court made two procedural errors in 
sentencing him.  First, Claude contends that the District Court failed to rule on his motion 
for a downward variance based on his testimony for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
in an unrelated trial.  Second, Claude argues that the District Court failed to consider 
properly, and failed to rule on, his motion for a downward variance to avoid unwarranted 
sentencing disparities between similarly situated defendants.   
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II1 
 The record of a district court must make clear that the court gave meaningful 
consideration to the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for the sentence 
imposed.  United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012).  “[I]f a party raises a 
colorable argument about the applicability of one of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, the 
district court may not ignore it.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  However, “[t]he district 
court need not raise every conceivable issue on its own initiative or even make explicit 
findings as to each sentencing factor if the record makes clear that the court took all the 
factors into account.”  Id.  Where a defendant’s argument for a below Guidelines 
sentence is “conceptually simple,” and it is clear from the record that the district court 
considered the relevant evidence and arguments, the sentencing judge is not required to 
provide an extensive explanation when denying the motion and sentencing within the 
Guidelines.  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-59 (2007).  
 Under our decision in United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(en banc), in order to preserve the issue for appeal, a party objecting to the procedural 
unreasonableness of a sentence, as here, must object after the sentence is imposed at a 
time when the district court still has an opportunity to correct the alleged error.  Id. at 
255-56.  If such an objection is timely made, we review for abuse of discretion.  Id. at 
259.   
                                              
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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 Despite failing to preserve his claims in the District Court, Claude argues that his 
objections are entitled to an abuse of discretion review because he was representing 
himself pro se and Flores-Mejia was decided only six weeks before his sentencing 
hearing.  See Br. of Appellant at 7-9.  We disagree.  After imposing his sentence, the 
District Court made a detailed inquiry into whether Claude harbored any procedural 
objections.  See Tr. of Sent’g Hr’g at 169-72 (Aug. 29, 2014).2  Under the circumstances 
presented in this case, our application of the Flores-Mejia rule does not demand the sort 
of flexibility that is sometimes given pro se litigants in other contexts.  Cf. Houston v. 
Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275 (1988) (pro se prisoners are deemed to have filed a notice of 
appeal when they deliver it to prison authorities because after that point they lose control 
of the notice and cannot monitor its timely processing); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 
153-54 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993) (permitting appellate review of waived objection to denial of 
request for counsel, because standard for appointment of counsel was unclear and 
appellant argued his lack of counsel was intertwined with his challenge to grant of 
summary judgment).  Our review of the sentencing transcript in this case leads us to 
conclude that Claude understood his obligations under Flores-Mejia, and he is bound by 
its tenets.  See Tr. of Sent’g Hr’g at 169-72; Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 256-57.   
 We may correct unpreserved objections to procedural errors at our discretion, but 
only where the error is “plain” and it affects the defendant’s “substantial rights.”  Puckett 
                                              
 2 The transcript of the sentencing hearing in this case is under seal.  Because we 
write primarily for the benefit of the parties, and they have access to the sealed transcript, 
we will cite to the portions of the sealed transcript that support our decision in lieu of 
quoting from or paraphrasing it.  
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v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  An error is 
“plain” if it is “clear or obvious.”  Id.  An effect on “substantial rights” ordinarily means 
prejudice, or that the error “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.”  Id.  
The burden is on the defendant to prove prejudice.  Id. at 141; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).   
Because Claude failed to preserve his objections, we will review his sentence for plain 
error. 
III 
 Claude moved for a downward variance based on his testimony for the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in an unrelated case.  He now argues that the District 
Court “failed to rule” on his motion because the District Court “never indicated whether 
it was granting or denying” the variance.  Br. of Appellant at 14.  Our review of the 
record belies Claude’s position.  After denying Claude’s motion for a downward 
departure based on his testimony for the Commonwealth, the District Court understood it 
could consider the same testimony in deciding whether to vary downward.  See Tr. of 
Sent’g Hr. at 78-79, 102-06.  And in fact, the District Court did consider and rule on 
Claude’s motion.  See Tr. of Sent’g Hr’g at 102-06, 150, 154-55.  The District Court had 
a reasoned basis for the sentence imposed and we find no procedural error.  See id.; 
United States v. Jones, 740 F.3d 127, 145 (3d Cir.) (“District Court’s thorough 
questioning and thoughtful discussion at sentencing refutes any contention that it 
somehow ignored defense counsel’s argument”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2319 (2014).  
 Next, Claude argues that the District Court failed to consider properly, and failed 
to rule on, his motion for a downward variance based on the need to avoid unwarranted 
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sentencing disparities.  See Br. of Appellant at 17-21.  We find these arguments to be 
without merit.  To the extent Claude even made a colorable argument, the record 
evidences that the District Court gave sufficient and proper consideration to the issues.  
See Tr. of Sent’g Hr’g at 105-07; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (permitting sentencing court to 
consider sentencing disparities among defendants with “similar records” who were found 
guilty of “similar conduct”); United States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94, 100 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(holding defendant bears burden of proving that circumstances of the purportedly similar 
defendants “exactly paralleled” defendant’s circumstances and “court should not consider 
sentences imposed on defendants in other cases in the absence of such a showing”).   
 In sum, the District Court did not commit plain error in its consideration of, or 
response to, Claude’s arguments or requests for downward variances under § 3553(a).  
See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135.3, 4                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
sentence. 
                                              
 3 Claude did not argue in his Brief that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the 
District Court’s conduct.   
 4 We further observe that even if the abuse of discretion standard were to apply to 
this appeal, which it does not, Claude has failed to demonstrate that the District Court 
abused its discretion.  See Br. of Appellant at 12-21; Tr. of Sent’g Hr’g at 149-57; United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568-69 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
